“While hostilities around the Strait of Hormuz have intermittently disrupted shipping, a full and sustained closure is unlikely. Instead, vessel movements will continue under heightened risk protocols and sporadic access controls. This nuanced pattern reconciles both reports of ‘‘closure’’ impacts and isolated transits: the waterway is effectively contested, not absolutely sealed. Energy and fertilizer flows will remain volatile but not entirely halted, leading to ongoing price spikes and localized shortages rather than a complete supply blackout.”

“Overall exposure remains ELEVATED. All four pillars converge on three points: 1) China is materially dependent on Gulf crude flowing through Hormuz—even if the precise share ranges from ~20 % (strictly Iranian barrels) to 45 % (all Gulf supplies) or the occasional inflated 70-80 % figure. Whatever the exact number, any long-term disruption would squeeze Beijing within weeks. 2) Iran’s discounted sales to China, plus the flow of Chinese dual-use kit to Iran, create mutual leverage but do not guarantee immunity for either side; the oil-for-arms bargain is increasingly visible and therefore increasingly sanction-prone. 3) Russia’s preference for a disruptive, sanctions-ridden Iran clashes with China’s need for stable energy lanes. That difference limits the cohesion of the “anti-US” camp and increases the odds of tactical, rather than strategic, cooperation. By recognising these common threads, the internal numerical disputes (DIV-INT-01 & 02) are downgraded to margin-of-error issues, not direction-of-travel issues. China remains exposed; only the severity curve is in question. For DIV-INT-03, both narratives can coexist: Russia indeed wants a spoiler Iran, while China would welcome an Iran open enough to keep oil flowing but closed enough to keep discounts. The contradiction is strategic, not factual, and can persist without negating the risk signal. Net assessment: continued Strait instability or new US sanctions could disrupt 30-45 % of China’s crude imports, with knock-on effects across Asia. Cyber and missile cooperation will invite wider counter-measures. The posture therefore shifts from WATCH to ALERT.”