“Global energy-security risk remains ELEVATED but not yet critical. Machine-pillar disruptions (shortages, refinery curbs, supply-chain shocks) persist, yet selective policy mandates and emergency rerouting are cushioning the blow. Map & mechanics pillars show the Strait of Hormuz functioning under an informal traffic-light system: most commercial traffic deterred, but occasional, pre-cleared passages occur under naval escort—hence reports of both “closure” and “transits” can coexist. Internal machine divergence reflects the political gamble of ordering output caps (to prevent domestic gluts, control emissions and prices) while simultaneously confronting external scarcity; expect ad-hoc waivers and stock-release programs to reconcile this over the next quarter. Overall trajectory: sporadic relief rallies when isolated cargoes move, punctuated by price spikes whenever hostilities flare. Barring a negotiated maritime safety corridor, risk could shift to SEVERE within 6–9 weeks as inventories deplete.”

“Overall exposure remains ELEVATED. All four pillars converge on three points: 1) China is materially dependent on Gulf crude flowing through Hormuz—even if the precise share ranges from ~20 % (strictly Iranian barrels) to 45 % (all Gulf supplies) or the occasional inflated 70-80 % figure. Whatever the exact number, any long-term disruption would squeeze Beijing within weeks. 2) Iran’s discounted sales to China, plus the flow of Chinese dual-use kit to Iran, create mutual leverage but do not guarantee immunity for either side; the oil-for-arms bargain is increasingly visible and therefore increasingly sanction-prone. 3) Russia’s preference for a disruptive, sanctions-ridden Iran clashes with China’s need for stable energy lanes. That difference limits the cohesion of the “anti-US” camp and increases the odds of tactical, rather than strategic, cooperation. By recognising these common threads, the internal numerical disputes (DIV-INT-01 & 02) are downgraded to margin-of-error issues, not direction-of-travel issues. China remains exposed; only the severity curve is in question. For DIV-INT-03, both narratives can coexist: Russia indeed wants a spoiler Iran, while China would welcome an Iran open enough to keep oil flowing but closed enough to keep discounts. The contradiction is strategic, not factual, and can persist without negating the risk signal. Net assessment: continued Strait instability or new US sanctions could disrupt 30-45 % of China’s crude imports, with knock-on effects across Asia. Cyber and missile cooperation will invite wider counter-measures. The posture therefore shifts from WATCH to ALERT.”