“(1) Succession outcome – High-probability path: Mojtaba Khamenei remains the officially recognised Supreme Leader. The single live-address report (claim 31410) is given higher evidentiary weight than unverified hospital/ventilator rumours, resolving the machine-vs-mechanics clash. Propaganda latency and battlefield fog explain sightings of a cardboard cut-out and coma stories; they pre-date the appearance and will continue to fade unless fresh proof of incapacity emerges. (2) Health uncertainty – Moderate risk: While leadership continuity is nominally secured, credible chatter about serious injuries indicates that Mojtaba’s physical fitness and therefore his day-to-day command capacity remain in doubt. This sustains internal-pillar friction (Mood & Machine), but is not decisive yet. (3) Alternative-leader noise – Low risk: Reports naming “Ali Moab” as Supreme Leader (claim 24525) are isolated, low-stability and temporally early; they are treated as misinformation released during the immediate post-strike confusion, resolving DIV-INT-04. (4) Power architecture – Under the current trajectory, real operational authority is drifting toward the IRGC/security nexus (appointment of Zolghadr, mosaic defence doctrine). Even if Mojtaba is partially incapacitated, the regime can function through this distributed structure. Expect hard-line policy continuity, intensified information control and continued ability to project force regionally. Overall posture: regime continuity with latent succession stress. Probability of abrupt collapse is low in the short term, but leadership-health rumours could catalyse elite factionalism over the next 3–6 months.”